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modelling are used in this study.
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Russia1. Introduction
Driving is a source of health risks throughout the world. The risks of
injury or death in road accidents tend to be particularly high in some
countries. For instance, the road fatality rate in Russia in 2004 was
two times higher than the average for the European Union, 23.9 deaths
per 100,000 population compared to 11.8 deaths [38,10]. More recent
ﬁgures suggest that the gap in road safety remains wide: the 2012
road fatality rates varied from 2.9 in Norway, to 3 in Sweden and
Denmark, to 19.6 in Russia and 23.6 in Malaysia [22].
A popular strategy for making roads safer involves the imposition of
heavy penalties for the violation of trafﬁc laws and regulations. This ap-
proach is based on economic reasoning: it is intended to limit the unsafe
behaviors of motorists and pedestrians on the road by increasing the
cost of trafﬁc offences. In Russia, a series of tighter measures went into
force in 2008, and these policies have been updated almost every year
since then.
However, attempts to enhance road safety by heavily penalizing
trafﬁc infractions do not always succeed. Their outcome depends on
several intervening variables, including the consistency and uniformity
of trafﬁc law enforcement. If enforcement is selective, which is charac-
teristic of counties with a high degree of corruption in the public servicessociation of Trafﬁc and Safety
wfoundland, Elizabeth Avenue,
x: +1 709 864 2075.
vier Ltd. on behalf of International Ass
0/).system, then the trafﬁc police ofﬁcers may view the harsh penalties as
an opportunity for soliciting or accepting bribes from the motorists
who fail to comply with the trafﬁc regulations (and the stricter these
regulations are, the more difﬁcult it is to respect their requirements).
As M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, a 19th-century Russian writer, reportedly
observed, the harshness of Russian laws is mitigated by the fact that
respecting them is optional. Corruption leads to the eventual transfor-
mation of the trafﬁc regulations as a tool for enhancing road safety
into a means for capturing rents.
Russia has one of the most corrupt public services in the world.
In 2014, Transparency International gave this country a score of 27
(out of 100) when calculating its corruption perception indexes
(the lower the score, the higher the level of corruption) [35]. Only
40 countries out of 174 had lower scores than Russia. Furthermore,
Russia's trafﬁc police (Gosudarstvennaya Inspektsiya Bezopasnosti
Dorozhnogo Dvizheniya, the Main Directorate for Road Trafﬁc Safety
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, GIBDD) is consistently
perceived by the population as the most corrupt government body
in this country [28]. In other words, the perceived extent of corruption
in the operations of Russia's trafﬁc police exceeds what is considered
to be a “norm” in a country with one of the highest levels of corruption
in the world.
The research problem addressed in this article is to explore how cor-
ruption affects road safety. The situation onRussian roads provides good
material for a case study taking into consideration the widespread
corruption in this country. The recent (2008 and later) changes in trafﬁc
regulations serve to highlight the problematic nature of the connections
between corruption and road safety: heavy penalties eventuallyociation of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. This is an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND
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make corruption self-sustainable.2. Elements of a theory of corruption on the roads
The economic theory of crime and punishment, an integral part of
law and economics, suggests that the application of harsher penalties
in the case of trafﬁc offences enhances road safety. Curiously enough,
the economic theory of crime and punishment had its origins in a trafﬁc
infraction. Becker got the idea that crime should not pay, i.e., the expect-
ed utility of committing a crimeminus the expected (dis)utility of being
caught and punished must always be negative, when deciding to park
illegally. “I calculated the likelihood of getting a ticket, the size of the
penalty, and the cost of putting the car in a lot. I decided it paid to
take the risk and to park on the street” [5: 389]. If the ﬁne and the prob-
ability of getting the ticket had been greater, Becker would have chosen
a legal way to park (but eventually missed the opportunity to gain this
valuable insight).
Law and economics use themodel of rational choice to explain devi-
ant behavior and offer solutions as to how to reduce its scope. Namely, a
rational individual will not commit a crime/infraction if he/she gains
more by following the rules. “The basic function of the law, in an eco-
nomic perspective, is to alter incentives” [26: 189]. Namely, themotorist
will be motivated to comply with the trafﬁc regulations not because of
any humanistic considerations, but because unsafe driving becomes
too costly. From this point of view, harsher penalties and the increased
probability of sanctioning the offenders will result in safer roads. Exam-
ples of applying this logic to practice abound. Governments of various
countries, both developed [19,20] and developing [3,33], seek a solution
to the problem of road safety by introducing more severe sanctions for
trafﬁc offences and their more certain detection.
Russia is no exception in this respect. The Russian government also
increases penalties for unsafe driving, allows the automatic detection
of most road trafﬁc offences with the help of trafﬁc enforcement cam-
eras (without even informing the motorists of their operation) and ex-
tends their network. The trafﬁc police ofﬁcers have the discretionary
power to record road trafﬁc and their interactionswith themotorists ei-
ther automatically or manually [9]. For instance, the penalty for driving
with an alcohol breath concentration exceeding the permitted level
(0.15 mg per liter of breath) in Russia is one of the highest in the
world: 30,000 rubles ($977US on November 15, 2013 when this most
recent regulation was adopted1) or detention for up to 15 days or
100–200 h of compulsory work, in keeping with Article 12.7.2 of the
Code of Administrative Offences.
In order to demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship in this
case between road safety and the expected (dis)utility of being caught
and punished for trafﬁc offences, the researcher has to control for the
impact of other variables affecting road safety. The level of corruption
is one. In 2012, the level of perceived corruption in a country was neg-
atively associated with the number of people killed in road accidents
in this country (r=−0.675, p b 0.001, N= 38 [22,35]).2
Rose-Ackerman [31: 301] deﬁnes corruption as “themisuse of public
power for private or political gain, recognizing that 'misuse'must be de-
ﬁned in terms of some standard.” Deﬁned in this way, corruption in-
volves breaking a norm, legal or moral [15]. A breach of a norm by a
state representative responsible for the enforcement of the trafﬁc laws
and regulations is particularly relevant. The size of a penalty is as impor-
tant as the certainty of its uniform and certain administration. Themore
severe the law, the more its application and enforcement tend to be1 A regulation, stipulating that the zero quantity of alcohol per litre of breath was man-
datory, existed previously, in 2010–2013.
2 Calculations by the author. Since Transparency International uses the inverted scale to
assess the perceived corruption (1 refers to themost corrupt government, 10 – to the least
corrupt), the more transparent a country's government is, the fewer motor vehicle crash
deaths it has.consequential. A selective and/or unjust application of a severe penalty
distorts the motorists' incentives: instead of attempting to drive more
safely, theymay hope to get preferential treatment by bribing the trafﬁc
police ofﬁcer, building useful connections in their environment, offering
some services in exchange or inﬂuencing their superiors.
In the case of the trafﬁc police, departures from the prescribed con-
duct can take various forms. To start with, trafﬁc policemen are expect-
ed to comply with the trafﬁc laws and regulations themselves [30]. If
they do not comply, then othermotoristswill tend to consider safe driv-
ing as optional and not mandatory. The trafﬁc police may also enforce
the trafﬁc laws and regulations differently depending on the offender's
social status. A lenient standard is applied to “useful,” “well connected”
individuals and those who can afford to buy “indulgences,” i.e., pay
bribes. The other motorists are subjected to the full force of the law.
Bribes do not always take amonetary form: the trafﬁc police ofﬁcers
may be interested in services offered by the offender or simply in main-
taining their reputation as “good citizens” in a local community [41]. In
some countries, including Russia, particular license plates serve to signal
the privileged status of the car's user. For instance, high-ranked state of-
ﬁcials and individuals working in law enforcement (the police, special
services, etc.) have such plates. They may also have other “signaling de-
vices,” such as emergencywarning lights. The proliferation of distinctive
license plates and emergency warning lights sometimes causes
irritation and eventual protests on the part of motorists with no such
privileges [2,8]. Furthermore, emergency warning lights and license
plates suggesting a car user's privileged status can eventually be bought
illegally from the trafﬁc police. This practice is also a form of corruption
[36].
The extant literature on corruption and road safety emphasizes the
importance of uniformity in the enforcement of trafﬁc laws and regula-
tions. Corruption undermines road safety in both developed [38] and
developing countries [27]. However, if one takes into account the indi-
rect effect of corruption, then the picture becomes murkier. Economists
know that corruption slows economic growth. Economic growth, in
turn, creates conditions for the intensiﬁcation of road trafﬁc and,
hence, eventually decreases road safety. Hua et al. [16] analysed both di-
rect (via the non-uniform implementation of safety regulations) and in-
direct (via per capita income) effects of corruption on road safety. They
found that the total effect of corruption on road safety tends to be pos-
itive in the low- andmiddle-income countries (per capita income levels
of $38,248 and less) and negative in high-income countries. Paradoxi-
cally, corruptionmightmake roads safer at the early stages of economic
development by suppressing economic growth. The ﬁrst research ques-
tion addressed in this paper is whether corruption affects road safety in
Russia, a middle-income country (in 2013 Russia's adjusted net national
income per capita in current US$ was $11,638 [40]), namely, whether
corruption undermines or enhances road safety in this country. A formal
hypothesis associated with this question (H1) predicts that corruption
tends to be positively associated with road safety in Russia.
An individual, who is subject to corrupt power, has two options:
either to accept the existing situation or to resist. Law and economics
predict that one has incentives to choose the second course of action if
corruption involves signiﬁcant costs, i.e., if the individual, who faces
an ofﬁcial abusing power, incurs a net loss. “The costs of punishing
any sort of victimless crime are great” [26: 187]. The use of economic
thinking to explain individual or mass mobilization against corruption
has a rationale under the circumstances: members of the upper middle
class and the rich have better chances of owning a car. Compared to
others, their behavior tends to be more calculating and utilitarian [43].
Bribery does not always contradict the interests of the people who
face the ofﬁcials abusing power. Several conﬁgurations are possible:
the ofﬁcial gains and the other party loses (as predicted by the
“tollbooth hypothesis” [7,21]), the ofﬁcial loses and the other party
wins (regulatory capture theory examines this case [34]), and both
parties involved win, however unequal their gainsmight be. Depending
on the circumstances, either themotorist or the trafﬁc police ofﬁcermay
3 See, for instance, the Supreme Court's rulings 5-AD09-6 (from 29.7.2009), 49-AD10-2
(from 19.2.2010), 18-AD10-12 (from 15.10.2010), 67-AD11-1 (from 25.3.2011), 78-
AD12-2 (from 1.3.2012), among others.
4 The author thanks Professor Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Center, for his kind assis-
tance in obtaining the dataset for this survey.
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greases thewheels of commerce” (thewheels of cars in this case) corre-
sponds to the second conﬁguration. The bribe-giver hopes to secure
some privileged treatment from the bribe-taker, which undermines
the competitiveness of the former's rivals.
The “win–win” situation in which both the bribe-giver and the
bribe-taker gain something has not been given enough attention in
the literature. The need to take into account a third party arguably ex-
plains this relative negligence. The third party, a “gatekeeper,” creates
conditions favorable to the ofﬁcial's rent-seeking activities. A “power
triad” that includes the gatekeeper, the bribe-taker, and the bribe-
giver eventually emerges [24].
For example, the legislatormakes the trafﬁc regulationsmore severe
and increases the penalties for road trafﬁc offences. The legislator plays
the role of a gatekeeper: he or she deﬁneswhat is legal andwhat consti-
tutes an offence or crime. It maywell be that compliancewith the trafﬁc
regulations becomes prohibitively costly to achieve, as in the case of the
zero tolerance to alcohol policy declared in Russia in 2010–2013 (the
motorists were heavily penalized if the quantity of alcohol per liter of
breath exceeded zero). The quantity of alcohol per liter of breath can
eventually exceed zero even after consumption of some non-alcoholic
beverages, such as fermented drinks (keﬁr, kvas). The consumption of
these beverages is an element of the local culture. The police ofﬁcer ac-
quires additional leverage when dealing with the motorists: many of
them become offenders against their will and the everyday sense of jus-
tice. This increases the attractiveness of a bribe for both the police ofﬁcer
(the bribe-taker) and the motorist (the bribe-giver). The former gains
extra cash income; the latter “buys” the right not to change traditional
patterns of consumption. What does the legislator (the gatekeeper)
win? The gatekeeper wins the police ofﬁcer's willingness to protect
the legislator's privileges on the road, ranging from distinctive license
plates and emergencywarning lights to excuses for road trafﬁc offences.
Such excuses can eventually be granted even if road accidents caused by
the legislator involve victims [2]. In the ﬁnal account, all parties
“win”—at the expense of road safety and the victims, of course.
As a result, a necessary condition for ﬁghting corruption consists in
the positive costs of being subject to corrupt power. A sufﬁcient condi-
tion refers to the relative costs and beneﬁts associated with a particular
strategy of individual or collective resistance. The institutional environ-
ment of a particular country, Russia in the case at hand, determines
these costs and beneﬁts.
The repertoire of individual strategies for ﬁghting corruption in
Russia includes the revelation and dissemination of information about
corruption in the trafﬁc police, the ﬁling of extra-judicial complaints
against the trafﬁc police, initiating legal actions, including appeals of
trafﬁc police ofﬁcers' decisions to the courts, among others. All three
strategies involve signiﬁcant costs, both monetary and non-monetary
(e.g., the time spent on going through all the stages of a complaint or
legal action).
The ﬁrst strategy requires a certain amount of freedomon the part of
themassmedia, which is not the case in Russia [39]. The Internet repre-
sents an alternative means for unveiling corrupt practices in the trafﬁc
police. There were several precedents with respect to attracting public
attention to the corruption in the GIBDD with the help of messages
posted on Youtube or in the social networks [8]. The second strategy
works only if the government has a political will to reform the trafﬁc po-
lice by increasing its transparency. This condition was present in
Georgia in 2003–2007 and greatly facilitated police reforms in this
post-Soviet country [18], but it is still absent in Russia. The third strategy
pays off if the rule of law – broadly deﬁned – is respected. In Russia, this
condition is not met. When the court deals with an appeal from a deci-
sion made by the trafﬁc police, the presumption of guilt prevails. The
courts tend to uncritically endorse police reports as the only valid evi-
dence. The Russian courts, including the Supreme Court, use a standard
formulation: the police protocol and the account provided by the road
trafﬁc ofﬁcer are found to be sufﬁcient proof that a road offence wasindeed committed.3 Documentary (hard) evidence or witnesses are
simply not required. Some Russian legal scholars argue in this respect
that the principle of strict liability was improperly borrowed from the
domain of civil law [17] and applied to the domain of administrative
law—to the cases involving trafﬁc offences [37].
As for collective strategies for ﬁghting corruption, their availability
depends on whether several additional conditions are met. First, a
corruption-free system has the characteristics of a public good for its
users, provided that their expected gain from transparent transactions
exceedswhat they expect towin by bribing state servants. This is not al-
ways the case, which eventually means that motorists have to solve the
prisoner's dilemma. A collectively preferable outcomemight remain out
of reach because themotorist individually hopes towinmore in the cor-
ruption game. Second, the private expected beneﬁts of overcoming cor-
ruption must exceed the associated private costs. The balance of one's
private beneﬁts and costs depends on the technology used for ﬁghting
corruption [25,32]. Third, collective mobilization has greater chances
of succeeding if people experience similar problems at the same point
in time. For instance, stolen elections (elections whose results are ma-
nipulated by the power holders) play the role of a focal point for all
the electors who cast their votes. Consequently, they have the potential
to become a trigger for mass mobilization [6]. In contrast to stolen elec-
tions, motorists do not have a focal point in their interactions with the
trafﬁc police: they meet its representatives face-to-face and at different
points in time.
The repertoire of Russian motorists' collective actions for ﬁghting
corruption includes the exchange of information concerning the mis-
deeds of the trafﬁc police, the lodging of collective petitions and com-
plaints, coordinated actions on the road (in contrast to street protests
during which the participants march by foot, the motorists protest by
driving their cars), and the decoration of the cars with some symbolical
objects (e.g., a blue bucket placed on the car's roof to mimic blue emer-
gency warning lights as a symbol of privileges on the road or white
ribbons used by the protesters against the stolen parliamentary elec-
tions in 2011; see [23]). The discussion of the potential for individual
and collective protests against corruption in the Russian trafﬁc police
leads to the second research question addressed in this article, name-
ly, Do Russian motorists have incentives to ﬁght corruption on the roads? A
hypothesis associated with this question (H2) states that Russian mo-
torists' expectations concerning the utility of bribery exceeds
what they expect to gain from the ﬁght against corruption in the
trafﬁc police. The trafﬁc police are not the only winners under the
circumstances.3. Data and methods
The format of a case study was used for this research. It analyzes the
situation in a single country, Russia. Case study research involves using
several data sources for an in-depth discussion of an individual case
[12]. Two data sources provide the information for this case study: on
one hand, the ofﬁcial statistical data generated by the Russian trafﬁc po-
lice [10] and the Federal State Statistics Service [11] and, on the other
hand, the data obtainedwith the help of a nationally representative sur-
vey carried out in September 2014 by the Levada Center, a leading
Russian independent pollster.4 One advantage of using the data collected
in a single country is its homogeneity and comparability: unlike data
collected in several countries, national data are arguably characterized
by similar biases and omissions.
There are two reasons for using ofﬁcial data to test H1. First, as a re-
sult of its duty to compile relevant statistics, the GIBDD data on road
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Fig. 1. “The number of road accidents per 10,000 vehicles registered by the trafﬁc police
and the number of motor vehicle crash deaths per 100,000 population in Russia, 2004–
2013.” Source: GIBDD [10].Note: Section 1.2 of the Rules of the Road of the Russian Feder-
ation provides the following deﬁnition of a road accident: “An accident that occurred on
the road with the involvement of a vehicle that produced victims and/or some material
damage.” The trafﬁc police are responsible for collecting data on road accidents. Changes
in the procedures for recording road accidents affect their number. For instance, since
March 1, 2009, victimless road accidents may eventually be documented without the in-
volvement of the trafﬁc police. This change must be taken into consideration when
interpreting an unusually sharp decrease in the number of road accidents recorded by
the trafﬁc police between 2007 and 2009 (Fig. 1). For this reason, the period considered
in the regression analysis below starts in 2010.
22 A. Oleinik / IATSS Research 40 (2016) 19–25safety are unique: there is no alternative data set covering all the
Russian regions. Second, the GIBDD data are easily and publicly
accessible (one possible explanation, as will be discussed in the next
section, involves the declining relative number of road accidents: the
GIBDD showcases its “success”). As for the decision to use secondary
data for testing H2, there is a weaker explanation. Due to resource limi-
tations, it was impossible to conduct a mass survey on a representative
sample using a speciﬁcally designed instrument. The Levada Center data
turned out to be a close, yet imperfect, alternative to what had been
sought.
The region (as of the start of 2014, 83 regions made up the Russian
Federation5) was the unit of observation and analysis in the ﬁrst data
set; the individual was the unit of analysis in the second. The ﬁrst data
set covers the period from 2010 through 2013 (the average values
for the variables of interest were used in order to eliminate chance
ﬂuctuations). Due to the limitations of the available data, the second
hypothesis was not tested in a comprehensive manner.
The key dependent variable for H1, road safety, was operationalized
through the number of road accidents reported per 10,000 vehicles. The
alternative operationalization, motor vehicle crash (MVC) victims – the
number of people who were injured and killed – per 100,000 inhabi-
tants (a version of this indicator, MVC deaths, was used, for example,
in [16,38]), was also used to increase the robustness of the reported re-
sults. The principal dependent variable for H2, the perceived corruption
of the trafﬁc police, was operationalized with the help of the question
“How widespread is corruption in the trafﬁc police?”
The selection of the indicators of the independent variables (corrup-
tion in the trafﬁc police for H1 and the willingness to pay bribes for H2)
and controls for the instrumental variables analysis using the ordinary
least squares (OLS) method of multiple regression modelling was guid-
ed, on onehand, by the availability of the data and, on the other hand, by
the relevant precedents. Hua et al. [16] and Vereeck and Vrolix [38] in-
cluded GDP per capita, the relative number of vehicles, the relative
number of doctors, the relative proportion of youth, and the physical
capital stock perworker in their lists of controls per capita. In both stud-
ies cited, the level of corruption was operationalized through the cor-
ruption perception index (CPI) by Transparency International. The
major limitation of the CPI is the eventual disconnection between
one's personal experience of corruption and his or her perception of
how widespread corruption is.6 The latter may be inﬂuenced by media
reports [29]. However, in some other studies, perceived corruption
andpersonally experienced corruption turned out to be closely associat-
ed [4]. This was also the case of corruption in the everyday interactions
of Russians: the value of Pearson's coefﬁcient of correlation between
the 2010 Corruption Perception Index for the Russian regions [13] and
the experience of a bribe solicited by government ofﬁcials during past
1–2 years per region [14] was moderately high and statistically
signiﬁcant: r=0.698, p b 0.001,N=65. The latter indicator (corruption
experienced by ordinary Russians) was entered into the regression
when testing H1.4. Results and discussion
During the past decade (2004–2013), there was a decline in the rel-
ative number of road accidents (Fig. 1). At the same time, the Russian
roads are still far from safe. The relative number of motor vehicle
crash deaths remains high by international standards and does not
decrease signiﬁcantly.5 Out of 83 subjects only 79 were retained for the analysis. Chechnyawas excluded due
to low data reliability. Out of four autonomous districts only one, Chukotka, is the subject
of the Russian Federation in its own right, whereas the Yamalo-Nenets, Nenets and
Khanty-Mansi districts are administratively subordinate to the other regions.
6 The CPI also reﬂects experts' perceptions of corruption that does not necessarily coin-
cide with ordinary people's opinions.The level of the perceived corruption in Russia also remains high.
There has been almost no variation in the CPI for this country over the
past two decades: 2.6 out of 10 in 1996, 2.8 in 2004, and 27 out of 100
in 2014. The corruption of the trafﬁc police exceeds the high bar of
what is considered as “normal” in the country with the highest level
of perceived corruption overall. The trafﬁc police are consistently con-
sidered to be themost corrupt government body. Answering a question
asked by the Levada Center as to how common corruption and bribery
are in various government bodies, 36% of the respondents replied that
corruption is “widespread” among the road police. The corresponding
ﬁgures for the police, the customs, and the federal ministries are
25.4%, 17.6%, and 12.7%, respectively.
Both personally experienced corruption and road safety vary across
the regions of the Russian Federation. This paves the way for testing H1
in a formal manner. The controls for the instrumental variable analysis
were classiﬁed in four groups: intensity of road use (number of private
cars per 1000 population, number of public buses per 100,000 popula-
tion, and road density), economic development (income per capita,
gross regional product per capita, retail trade turnover per capita, and
investments in capital assets per capita), deviance (number of regis-
tered crimes per 100,000 population), and human development (pro-
portion of youth, population per doctor and number of university
students per 10,000 population). Following a correlational analysis,
four variables were dropped due to correlations that were either too
low (road density and number of university students per 10,000) or
too high (GRP per capita and retail trade turnover per capita). High
correlations, for instance, cause the problem of multicollinearity.7
Weakly correlated variables are thought to have weak effects on the
dependent variable and might be excluded if better predictors are
available [44: 11]. The independent variable (personally experienced
corruption) and the controls were entered by groups, which produced
seven models (Table 1).7 A tolerance of less than 0.20 or 0.10 and/or a variance inﬂation factor (VIF) of 5 or 10
and above indicates amulticollinearity problem.When entered into the regressionmodel,
both variables with high correlation coefﬁcients produce a VIF and tolerance that exceeds
these critical values.
Table 1
“Results of statistical (Method= Enter) multiple regression for predicting the number of road accidents and the number of motor vehicle crash victims (Y) from personally experienced
corruption and the control variables: number of cars per 1000 population, number of public buses per 100,000 population (Lg10), income per capita (Lg10), investments in capital assets
per capita, number of registered crimes per 100,000 population, proportion of youth (15 years old and younger) in the population, and population per doctor, standardized (beta)
coefﬁcients, 2010–2013, Russia.”
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable Road accidents MVC victims
N of private cars per 1000 population −.15 (−1.36) −.06 (−.52) −.16 (−1.33) −.31 (−2.37)⁎ −.29 (−2.27)⁎ .19 (1.49) .29 (2.13)⁎
N of public buses per 100,000 population (Lg10) −.27 (−2.51)⁎ −.14 (−1.23) .18 (1.72)† .15 (1.41) .15 (1.44) .13 (.12) .07 (.59)
Income per capita (Lg10) −.59 (−3.58)⁎⁎ −.32 (−1.99)⁎ −.20 (−1.29) −.20 (−1.29) −.33 (−2.04)⁎
Investments in capital assets per capita (Lg10) .39 (2.54)⁎ .30 (2)⁎ .29 (2.07)⁎ .31 (2.24)⁎ .27 (2.32)⁎ .44 (3.07)⁎⁎
Bribe experienced −.37 (−3.23)⁎⁎ −.26 (−2.28)⁎ −.29 (−2.84)⁎⁎ −.22 (−2.01)⁎
Crime rate −.04 (−.33) .09 (.77)
Proportion of youth −.23 (−1.98)⁎ −.21 (−1.85)† −.19 (−1.62) −.17 (−1.45)
People per doctor .28 (2.53)⁎ .26 (2.42)⁎ .29 (2.66)⁎ .24 (2.2)⁎
Bribe experienced × income per capita (Lg10) −.24 (−2.21)⁎
C (unstandardized coefﬁcient) 89.75 (6.33)⁎⁎⁎ 282.09 (4.38)⁎⁎⁎ 136.84 (2.47)⁎ 89.83 (1.54) 87.77 (1.51) −118.70 (−.8) 328.94 (1.27)
R2 .09 .23 .31 .41 .40 .32 .36
R2adj .07 .19 .25 .33 .33 .26 .29
F-statistic 3.95⁎ 5.46⁎⁎ 4.88⁎⁎⁎ 5.37⁎⁎⁎ 6.09⁎⁎⁎ 5.08⁎⁎⁎ 5.08⁎⁎⁎
Obs. 78 78 71 71 71 71 71
† Signiﬁcant at α= .1.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at α= .05.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at α= .01.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at α= .001.
23A. Oleinik / IATSS Research 40 (2016) 19–25Model 1 shows that themore developed public transportation is, the
fewer road accidents occur. However, this relationship becomes statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant after controlling for the economic development indi-
cators (Model 2). Income per capita turned out to be negatively
associated with road safety, whereas investments in capital assets per
capita were associated positively. Industrial growth seems to produce
less safe roads as a result of the increased intensity of their use. As for
the negative effect of Income per capita, one possible explanation
could be the more advanced cars that wealthy people can buy. Techni-
cally more sophisticated cars can be driven more safely. Corruption en-
hances road safety: the personal experience of paying a bribe is
associated with fewer road accidents (Model 3). Income per capita
loses its statistical signiﬁcance after Personally experienced corruption
is entered. The positive relationship between corruption and road safety
in Russia does not disappear after the human development indicators
are entered (Models 4 and 5). The relative number of cars becomes sig-
niﬁcant at this stage only after accounting for personally experienced
corruption, the state of the health system, and income per capita. Ad-
vanced cars, even in growing numbers, do not always decrease road
safety.
The existence of a link between corruption and road safety is further
validated after the MVC victims indicator is substituted for Number of
road accidents as the dependent variable (Model 7). Thisﬁnding corrob-
orates that reported by Hua et al. [16]: in the low- and middle-income
countries, corruption depresses economic development and, conse-
quently, keeps roads safer than they would otherwise be. The addition
of an interaction term between income per capita and personally expe-
rienced corruption to the model (Model 6) does not undermine this
conclusion.8 The interaction term has a positive impact on road safety,
even if more variance in the dependent variable can be explained by
considering the impact of corruption separately. The quality of the
models can be deemed satisfactory: Model 5, for instance, explains
33.4% of the variance in the relative number of road accidents.
As a result of this study, H1 can be accepted. The bottom line is that
the existence of a positive connection between corruption and road
safety is conﬁrmed for Russia, a middle-income country. The next ques-
tion is how to break this link: corruption enhances road safety in a way8 The original variables, Income per capita and Personally experienced corruption,were
dropped because of their high collinearity with the interaction term.that undermines social and economic development. The discussion of
H2 serves to address this issue: the link will continue to exist as long
as Russian motorists do not have incentives to ﬁght corruption on the
roads.
The use of secondary data limited the range of available options and
prevented the researcher from testing H2 in a comprehensive manner.
The most relevant questions from the Levada Center survey had
nominal-level formulations, which necessitated their transformation
into dummy variables. The dependent variablewas the respondent's as-
sessment of how widespread corruption is in the trafﬁc police. The as-
sessment of how common a particular form of corruption is in Russia
represented the key independent variable. Namely, principal emphasis
was placed on whether the respondents consider bribes offered by the
bribe-giver (the motorist under the circumstances) and bribes solicited
by the bribe-taker (the road police ofﬁcer under the circumstances) to
be typical. Three Russian terms appear relevant: vzyatochnichestvo
(bribery broadly deﬁned), vymogatel'stvo (extortion), and podkup
(bribes offered to a government ofﬁcial). If extortion is believed to pre-
vail in Russia, then themotorists do not necessarily consider themselves
to be awinning party. If the two other forms reportedly prevail, then the
motorist wins something from the corrupt practices and he or she has
no incentives for changing the situation. As long as themotorist receives
a positive pay-off from corruption, he or she arguably has no interest in
ﬁghting it. The analysis of frequencies suggests that the respondent be-
lieves that vzyatochnichestvo prevails (44%) followed by podkup (22%)
and extortion (20%). This means that cases in which a bribe is offered
by the motorist are relatively more common than cases in which a
bribe is solicited by the trafﬁc police ofﬁcer. By taking the initiative
when it comes to corrupt practices, the motorist shows his or her
unwillingness to change them.
The list of the controls included place of residence (this dummy var-
iable served to identify people living in large – 500,000 plus inhabitants
– urban areas), gender, education, voting behavior (whether the re-
spondent voted for President Putin in the past presidential elections,
i.e., how close he or she is to the mainstream political culture), age,
and socio-economic status (a self-described membership in the
middle-class using the ordinal level of income as a criterion). Most con-
trols are intended to verify if the members of the Russian middle-class
as a demographic, economic, and political construct, tend to take initia-
tives in bribery or, on the contrary, if they perceive themselves as
Table 2
“Results of statistical (method = forward, criterion: probability of F to enter ≤0.05) mul-
tiple regression for predicting answers to the question How widespread is corruption
among the trafﬁc police? (Y) from the agreement that bribes are a common form of cor-
ruption controlling for place of residence, gender, education, voting behavior, age, socio-
economic status, standardized (beta) coefﬁcients, 2014, Russia.”
Step 1 Step 2
Large city (Moscow and 500,000+ cities) .17 (5.87)⁎⁎⁎ .17 (6.05)⁎⁎⁎
Bribes as a common form of corruption .13 (4.49)⁎⁎⁎
Not entered (t values)
Gender (1 = male) 1.46 1.31
Education (1 = some higher education) .66 .61
Putin voter (1 = yes) .67 .48
Income per capita (Lg10) 1.11 1.06
Age .84 .84
Status (ordinal: poor–lower middle–middle–upper
middle–rich)
−.43 −.64
Bribes as a common form of corruption (1 = yes) 4.49⁎⁎⁎
Extortion as a common form of corruption (1 = yes) −.11 −.84
Podkup as a common form of corruption (1 = yes) 1.67† 1.20
24 A. Oleinik / IATSS Research 40 (2016) 19–25victims of corruption. For the dummy variables, Levene's test for the
equality of variances was run. In all cases but one (the group of Putin
voters vs. the respondents who cast their votes for the other candi-
dates), the equality of variances was observed.9
At the ﬁrst stage of themultiple regression analysis carried out using
the forward method, the dummy variable for inhabitants of large urban
agglomerations was entered (Table 2). At the second stage, the dummy
variable for vzyatochnichestvo as a prevailing form of corruption in
Russia was entered. It should be noted that the contribution of the
dummy variable for podkup also attained the level of statistical signiﬁ-
cance (if α is set at the 0.1 level) at the ﬁrst stage. The predictive
power of the model remains poor: about 95% of the variance in the de-
pendent variable cannot be explained by the variables included in the
model. The outcomes of this test, nevertheless, tend to provide some
support for H2. Choosing between bribes solicited by a government ofﬁ-
cial and bribes offered to a government ofﬁcial, the respondents believe
that the latter form prevails in Russia. If this is conﬁrmed with the help
of a more comprehensive test, this means that the Russianmotorists do
not have incentives for ﬁghting corruption on the roads.C (unstandardized coefﬁcient) 3.21
(130.54)⁎⁎⁎
3.13
(100.87)⁎⁎⁎
R2 .03 .05
R2adj .03 .04
F-statistic 34.48⁎⁎⁎ 27.72⁎⁎⁎
Obs. 1172 1172
Source: Levada Center data.
Note: In order to enhance representativeness, the datawereweighted by the respondent's
gender, education, and vote in the 2012 presidential elections.
† Signiﬁcant at α= .1.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at α= .001.5. Conclusion
This study conﬁrmed that, under some circumstances, namely, at the
early stages of economic development, corruption contributes to
enhancing road safety. This outcome is counter-intuitive: the negative
effects of corruption are believed to prevail. In order to detect the posi-
tive effect of corruption on road safety in Russia, two links between
these two variables were differentiated and assessed empirically. The
indirect effect of corruption on road safety is positive. Corruption
suppresses economic growth and, thus, reduces the intensity of road
use [16]. This indirect effect seems to prevail in the case of Russia, a
middle-income country. Investments in capital assets per capita were
associated positively with the indicator of road unsafety in all models
in which the latter variable was entered (Models 2–7).
The direct effect of corruption on road safety is negative; it works in
the opposite direction. The impact of experienced corruption on the de-
pendent variable was always found to be negative. InModels 3–5 and 7,
it was assessed controlling for the positive effect of investments as an
engine of economic growth. Corruption undermines uniformity in the
enforcement of the trafﬁc laws and regulations, however severe they
might be. The direct effect reportedly prevails in developed countries.
The more uniform compliance with the trafﬁc regulations, the safer
the roads. Vereeck and Vrolix observed that uniform compliance in
the EUmember-countries with some rulesmattersmore than their con-
tent, for instance, their severity. “What is irrelevant, though, is not the
absence, but the speciﬁc content of the legal rules” [38: 401].
In Russia, the connection between corruption and road safety has a
sustainable character since all the parties involved win something. The
Russianmotorists are not only victims of extortion but also take the ini-
tiative in terms of bribery. Thiswould be impossible if they gained noth-
ing from a bribe. Under the present circumstances – the enactment of
the increasingly severe trafﬁc laws and regulations, the application of
increasing ﬁnes and penalties, and the high costs of ﬁghting corruption9 The table below contains the outcomes of Levene's test for the equality of variances:
Dummies F Sig.
Gender 0.081 0.776
Large city 2.479 0.116
Higher education 0.003 0.956
Putin voter 5.873 0.015
Vzyatochnichestvo as a common form of corruption 0.289 0.591
Extortion as a common form of corruption 0.132 0.717
Podkup of state ofﬁcials as a common form of corruption 0.411 0.522– it is cheaper to pay a bribe than to attempt to change the system by ei-
ther individual or collective efforts. For example, neither the corruption
perception index nor the personal experience of giving bribes turned
out to be correlatedwith an index of protest potential in the Russian re-
gions [42]. Protest potential refers to the respondent's willingness to
join mass protests and his or her assessments of other people's level of
dissatisfaction with life conditions. The corresponding correlation
coefﬁcients were−0.087 (N= 65) and−0.075 (N= 72).
A vicious circle emerges as a result. The corruption of the trafﬁc po-
lice is self-replicating through rational choices under particular circum-
stances. Russian motorists' rational considerations lead them to accept
bribery instead of ﬁghting corruption. Attempts to enhance compliance
with the trafﬁc laws and regulations by increasing their severity turn
out to be counter-productive: they contribute to the spread of corrup-
tion instead. The observed decrease in the number of road accidents
has to be attributed to the spread of corruption as an intervening vari-
able between the expected (dis)utility of punishment and road safety,
even if some government ofﬁcials may consider it as a validation for
their insistence on the “law and order” approach toward road safety.
The present study has several limitations that call for further re-
search. First, the available data do not sufﬁce for testingH2: the reported
results only warrant additional studies. Namely, in order to conﬁrm or
reject the assumption that a power triad involving the legislators, the
trafﬁc police and the motorists has emerged in Russia, one needs to
collect data on the legislators' (gatekeepers') interests – their voting
on bills regarding road safety and their record of committing trafﬁc of-
fences. Second, more data are needed to more carefully differentiate
the impact on road safety of, on one hand, changes in the trafﬁc laws
and regulations and, on the other hand, the variation in the scope of
the corruption of the trafﬁc police (personally experienced corruption
at the regional level is measured irregularly in Russia). Third, the collec-
tion and inclusion in themodel of data on the number of trafﬁc enforce-
ment cameras per region would allow us to better assess the effect of
more severe penalties on road safety. In the case of violations of trafﬁc
regulations automatically detected with the help of video-recording
devices, the trafﬁc police have less room for abuses of power.
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